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Director of
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National Intelligence Daily

Friday
14 January 1983

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SURINAME: Military Purge

Army Commander Bouterse's purge of the officer corps earlier this week, which was designed to eliminate malcontents and potential conspirators, probably has temporarily strengthened his hold on power. [redacted] 25X1

Bouterse fired 12 officers on Monday and an additional 11 officers resigned on Wednesday, virtually wiping out the entire officer corps. Most were disgruntled with the regime's policies and had been reluctant to perform even routine duties. [redacted] Bouterse 25X1 cited one officer's "close ties" to the US Embassy as the reason for his dismissal and warned the others they would be watched carefully. [redacted] 25X1

The dismissals follow Deputy Army Commander Horb's reported resignation last week. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

[redacted]

Comment: Bouterse's fear of a conspiracy probably has been partially eased by the departure of Horb and his fellow officers. His support in the military has dwindled substantially, but [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] potential opponents of the regime have been 25X1 intimidated and disarmed. [redacted] 25X1

The cashiered officers and other military dissenters would be more likely to flee the country--as several have already done--rather than attempt a coup. If Bouterse senses a threat from this group, however, he might execute some of its members. [redacted] 25X1

Bouterse probably will turn to the Group of 16--his hardcore military cadre--to fill key slots and promote loyal noncommissioned officers to company command positions. He also is likely to expand the small People's Militia and reorganize the civilian police force, whose support has been unreliable in the past. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

[redacted]

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POLAND: Anti-Western Campaign

The recent harassment of Western embassies and news services largely reflects the regime's determination to maintain tight domestic security following the "suspension" of martial law. [redacted] 25X1

The authorities have forced correspondents from the BBC and UPI to leave Poland and have threatened to withhold work permits for Polish employees of Western journalists. The regime also has instructed officials not to meet with US Embassy and Consular officers and has harassed young people attending cultural events at the Embassy. In addition, Warsaw is continuing its vitriolic anti-US campaign, which includes posters lampooning President Reagan. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: With the suppression of the Solidarity underground, the security services may have successfully argued that they now have to be allowed to tackle the threats posed to the regime by Poles' contacts with Westerners. They probably believe the atmosphere of openness that existed in the 1970s enabled the West to give the psychological and material support to the "enemies of socialism" that eventually helped give rise to Solidarity. [redacted] 25X1

Others in the government may be seeking to use the campaign to create greater bargaining leverage for Warsaw. They may calculate that, because the relaxation measures did not lead to the reduction of sanctions, it is time to use more forceful tactics. These officials may hope to split the US from its Allies. [redacted] 25X1

The momentum appears to lie with hardliners, who probably are ready to take additional steps to impose permanent restrictions on political, cultural, and social ties with the West. Whatever the case, the security-conscious regime is unlikely in the near future to tolerate any extensive contacts with the West. [redacted] 25X1

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FRANCE-US: Defense Minister's Visit

Defense Minister Hernu probably expects his discussions next week with US defense and foreign policy officials to center on East-West trade and NATO's INF plans. [redacted] 25X1

The French have agreed to participate in parallel studies in NATO, COCOM, and in the OECD on security, financial, and energy aspects of East-West economic relations. President Mitterrand has stated publicly, however, that France will not engage in "economic warfare" aimed at weakening the USSR's economy. Although Paris has tightened controls on transfers of sensitive technology, it recently approved selling the USSR telephone switching equipment that involves integrated circuit production technology. [redacted] 25X1

The Mitterrand government supports NATO's dual-track decision on INF and worries that the debate in the West German election campaign on INF might increase opposition to deployment throughout the Alliance. Paris is encouraging Bonn to remain firm on its commitment to deploy INF missiles on schedule if necessary. French officials have criticized those West German opposition leaders who imply a readiness to abandon Bonn's commitment and to support consideration of French nuclear weapons in the INF talks. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: France will resist any US effort to control its trade ties with the East and will continue to try to rectify its trade deficit with the USSR by increasing sales. Although high-technology trade represents only a small part of the French total, it provides jobs in some sectors hard hit by recession. [redacted] 25X1

France's Ambassador to Moscow has objected to Soviet attempts to take French nuclear forces into account in Geneva. France's permanent representative to NATO has cautioned the Allies not to waver in their support of the French position. Hernu would welcome US reassurances in that regard. [redacted] 25X1

Hernu also is likely to discuss French-US cooperation in Lebanon, France's possible purchase of the AWACS aircraft, and nuclear-powered warship visits. [redacted] 25X1
25X1
[redacted]

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THAILAND: Power Play by Army Chief

Army Commander in Chief Athit is calling for a constitutional amendment to ensure the military remains heavily involved in politics. [redacted] 25X1

The constitution currently stipulates that many powers of the military-dominated Senate are to be transferred to the elected National Assembly in April. The latter now plays a weak secondary role to the Senate, which is mainly composed of retired military and police officers appointed by the Prime Minister. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

The US Embassy says Athit's proposal caught the elected parliamentarians by surprise. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: The call by Athit will embitter many public leaders and probably will provoke student protests. Most political parties, however, are likely to go along with Athit because they lack the discipline, organization, and leadership to oppose the military. [redacted] 25X6

[redacted] 25X6

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KAMPUCHEA: Sihanouk's Intentions

Prince Sihanouk, head of the tripartite, anti-Vietnamese coalition government of Kampuchea, is claiming serious health problems and intends to withdraw temporarily from the coalition, according to an unconfirmed press report. [redacted] 25X1

In the past few months Sihanouk has complained he was being taken for granted and manipulated by other countries. He is also disturbed by reports his coalition partners--the Communist Democratic Kampuchea and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front--are using his name to attract recruits for their own forces. [redacted] 25X1

Sihanouk, moreover, is angry with China over what he sees as its preferential treatment of Democratic Kampuchea. The US Embassy in Beijing reports he is frustrated by the lack of materiel support from the Chinese and others for his military forces. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: A decision to leave the coalition almost certainly would not be based on poor health, [redacted] 25X6
[redacted] 25X6
[redacted] He has withdrawn from a position of responsibility in the past to strengthen his hand. [redacted] 25X6 25X1

Sihanouk might believe a threat to quit could improve his chances of being invited to the Nonaligned Movement's Summit in New Delhi in March. He could not attend the meeting without representing the coalition, which India does not recognize. [redacted] 25X1

Any absence by Sihanouk from resistance and coalition affairs probably would be only temporary. Even a brief withdrawal, however, would worsen already strained relations within the coalition. [redacted] 25X6

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MOZAMBIQUE-ZIMBABWE: Insurgent Threat

South African - backed Mozambican insurgents have publicly threatened to launch raids into Zimbabwe unless Harare withdraws its troops that are helping to protect a key oil pipeline in Mozambique. [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1 25X1

Comment: The Zimbabweans apparently have about 2,000 troops in Mozambique. Harare is unlikely to withdraw them, because the pipeline is Zimbabwe's only means of avoiding total dependence on South Africa for fuel. Pretoria may encourage the expansion of guerrilla activity into Zimbabwe in an effort to persuade Harare to reduce its involvement in Mozambique and make political concessions South Africa has sought, including ministerial-level talks on bilateral relations. [redacted] 25X1

WEST GERMANY: Clarifying INF Policy

Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Woerner both have denied publicly that the West German Government has abandoned the previous government's insistence that at least one other nonnuclear continental Ally has to proceed with INF deployment as a precondition for eventual West German deployments. The press reported earlier this week that Chancellor Kohl had promised US officials in November that West Germany would proceed with deployments no matter what other potential basing countries do. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: The government's denial is an effort to avoid damaging the Christian Democrats' prospects in the election on 6 March. Now that the government has taken a public stand on this question for the first time, any decision that West Germany would deploy alone would come only at great political cost. [redacted] 25X6 25X6

[redacted]

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

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INDONESIA-AUSTRALIA: Defense Cooperation

Australian Defense Minister Sinclair will formally propose cooperation on maritime surveillance during his visit to Indonesia late this month, according to the US Embassy in Canberra. [redacted] 25X6

[redacted] 25X6

Comment: Agreement to discuss maritime cooperation reflects the easing of tension over Australia's criticism of Indonesia's policies in East Timor. Jakarta has become increasingly concerned over guarding its vital maritime approaches, particularly the Sunda, the Lombok, and the Malacca Straits, and cooperation would improve its limited surveillance capabilities. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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Special Analysis

USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: Growing Problem for the Soviets

The deteriorating security situation in Mozambique has spurred efforts by the USSR to slow the South African - backed insurgency there. The Soviets have increased arms shipments but probably want to avoid greater military commitment. Such involvement would risk widening the war and damaging their policies elsewhere. If the survival of the Marxist regime in Maputo appeared to be at stake, however, Moscow probably would feel compelled to act more decisively to demonstrate its reliability as an ally. Under such circumstances, the USSR might put pressure on Cuba to send troops to Mozambique. [redacted] 25X1

The recent flurry of contacts involving the Soviets, Cubans, and Mozambicans reflects this increasing worry in Moscow. Late last month a Soviet military delegation headed by the general responsible for military assistance was in Mozambique. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Developments in Mozambique and Angola also were high on the agenda during the visit to Moscow late last month by a Cuban delegation led by Vice President Raul Castro. Castro met with General Secretary Andropov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and twice with Ustinov. Last year senior Cuban officials and military officers visited Mozambique at least three times. [redacted] 25X1

Accelerated Soviet arms shipments to Mozambique also reflect Moscow's concerns about the security situation. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

The Soviets have made at least three other arms deliveries to Mozambique since last spring [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] They have 25X1
provided tanks, artillery pieces, air defense equipment, and a newer model armored personnel carrier. Despite the additional arms, the insurgency continues to spread and the rebels are now active in most of Mozambique. [redacted] 25X1

Machel's Concerns

Machel probably would prefer to avoid substantial foreign involvement in the counterinsurgency effort. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

The President almost certainly also realizes that the governments of most neighboring states would be disturbed by an influx of Cuban soldiers, and that calling them in would undermine Mozambique's efforts to expand economic and other links with the West. In addition, he is aware that an influx of Cuban troops would raise the prospect of a full-scale South African attack. [redacted] 25X1

Possible Use of Cuban Troops

The Cuban Ambassador in Mozambique indicated late last summer that he expected Maputo to request Cuban troops. Moscow, however, probably hopes to avoid this because of the costs and the fact that Mozambique is only of peripheral importance to its interests. [redacted] 25X1

Initially, Andropov probably would stall and might offer more Soviet military aid. He also might agree to a limited accommodation between Mozambique and South Africa. [redacted] 25X1

A deployment of Cuban troops would undercut Moscow's efforts to persuade the US, other Western countries, and China of its peaceful intentions in the international

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arena. Andropov, who has already made blockage of US INF deployments top priority, would be particularly concerned about the impact on relations with West Germany and France, which have been active in trying to work out a settlement on Namibia. [redacted] 25X1

The possibility of a tough South African military response also would be an inhibiting factor. It could lead to heavy Cuban casualties and force Moscow to choose between increasing its military involvement or retreating. The USSR and Cuba probably also would be wary of becoming bogged down in another counterinsurgency effort. [redacted] 25X1

The question of the dispatch of Cuban troops, moreover, could strain Soviet-Cuban relations. President Castro may be reluctant to commit Cuban forces to a new counterinsurgency effort in Africa. [redacted] 25X1

In addition, Central America is of primary importance to Castro, and he may be concerned that the deteriorating security situation in Nicaragua could require a Cuban combat presence. [redacted] 25X1

Despite these concerns, Castro might see an increased military involvement in Mozambique as an opportunity to extract a significant increase in aid from the Soviets at a time when Cuba is facing severe economic problems. In the final analysis, however, the USSR's substantial economic and military leverage over Cuba would persuade Castro to go along with Moscow's decision. [redacted] 25X1

Prospects

A Mozambican call for Cuban troops, if it should occur soon, would be the first significant test of Andropov's policy in the Third World. Past Soviet practice suggests that if other alternatives proved inadequate and Moscow decided Cuban forces were essential to preserve a pro-Soviet regime in Maputo, the Soviets probably would try to arrange to send them. [redacted] 25X1

The new Soviet leadership has already restated a commitment to sustain revolutionary regimes. It would be likely to reason that a failure to act could encourage US efforts to challenge the USSR's interests elsewhere in the Third World. [redacted] 25X1

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